Manchester Arena Inquiry report: Emergency services apologise for 'wholly inadequate' response in wake of terror attack

Their words came after the publication of a report which found one of the 22 people murdered would probably have survived but for inadequacies in the emergency response.

Care worker John Atkinson, 28, was six metres away when the explosion went off in the City Room foyer of the venue at the end of an Ariana Grande concert on May 22 2017. A member of the public used his wife's belt as a tourniquet on Mr Atkinson's leg as he lay bleeding in agony on the foyer’s floor for up to 50 minutes, during which time he told a police officer: "I'm gonna die."

Confusion over whether an armed terrorist was still on the loose meant that only three paramedics entered the room on the night to treat the dying and injured.

Mr Atkinson's family said: "It is crystal clear that due to those failings, John died from injuries that he could and should have survived. John must have known that he was dying and the pain that causes us is too great to put into words. This should simply never have been allowed to happen."

Among the others killed in the terror attack were Sorell Leczkowski, 14, from Leeds; Courtney Boyle, 19, a Leeds Beckett University student from Gateshead, and Wendy Fawell, 50, from Otley.

On Thursday, Manchester Arena Inquiry chairman Sir John Saunders delivered his scathing report on the response of the emergency services. It identified how “significant aspects” of the emergency response went wrong and made 149 recommendations.

Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police (GMP) Stephen Watson later told a press conference: "We failed to plan effectively and the execution of that which was planned was simply not good enough."

He continued: "I fully accept the findings of the chair, Sir John Saunders. Beyond the selflessness and professionalism of so many of our frontline staff, it is also clear that our co-ordination of the response to this atrocity was poor.

"Sadly GMPs failings were significant. We failed to plan effectively and the execution of that which was planned was simply not good enough. Our actions were substantially inadequate and fell short of what the public have every right to expect, and for this, I apologise unreservedly."

Apologies were also offered by senior figures in British Transport Police, North West Ambulance Service and Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service, with Chief Fire Officer Dave Russel saying the service's response to the bombing will "forever be a matter of deep regret".

He said: "Our response that night was wholly inadequate and totally ineffective and that will forever be a matter of deep regret for our service. We let families and the public down in their hour of need and for that I am truly sorry.”

Failures highlighted in the report included:

- The initial command of the incident was taken by Greater Manchester Police's (GMP) force duty officer, Inspector Dale Sexton, who quickly became overwhelmed by the number of tasks in hand.

- Insp Sexton failed to tell other emergency services he had declared Operation Plato - a pre-arranged plan for a suspected marauding terrorist

- No common rendezvous point for 999 services was established

- Fire crews took more than two hours to even attend the incident after station manager Andy Berry chose to mobilise resources three miles from the Arena amid fears over safety.

- Evacuation of casualties failed, with 36 people still waiting to be taken from the City Room past midnight.

By 10.50pm, the City Room was a "cold zone" said Sir John, where it was assessed there was no immediate threat to life from an armed terrorist – but neither paramedics nor firefighters were deployed en masse to that area amid confusion over whether an armed terrorist was still on the loose. Instead, ambulances lined up outside the venue and firefighters mustered at a fire station three miles away.

Sir John's first report on security issues at the Arena was issued last June and highlighted a string of "missed opportunities" to identify suicide bomber Salman Abedi as a threat before he walked across the City Room and detonated his shrapnel-laden device.

The third and final report will focus on the radicalisation of Abedi and what the intelligence services and counter-terrorism police knew, and if they could have prevented the attack. It will be published at a later date.